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RE-EVALUATING THE EMERGING STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR  
MATCHING RIGHTS IN CONTROL TRANSACTIONS 
BY BRIAN JM QUINN* 
ABSTRACT 
In recent years courts have taken a permissive approach to matching 
rights, viewing them as standard features in merger agreements.  Matching 
rights are deal protection devices intended to give the rightholder assurance 
that the deal will be completed, consequently these measures can deter 
subsequent bidders and, in the event a subsequent bid appears, ensure that 
the initial bidder is advantageously positioned to succeed.  This Article 
argues that courts should re-evaluate the emerging legal standard 
governing the use of "matching rights" in merger agreements. 
Plaintiffs have brought challenges to the use of matching rights in 
various circumstances.  Until now, however, courts have refused to 
acknowledge that there might be circumstances in which matching rights 
are preclusive deal protections and therefore unreasonable.  Consequently, 
the emerging legal standard with respect to matching rights is one of 
permissiveness.  In fact, there are circumstances in which one can expect 
matching rights to be potentially powerful deterrents to second bidders.  In 
such circumstances, the use of matching rights may be unreasonable.   
Courts should employ the same fact-intensive review to the use of 
matching rights that they employ with respect to other deal protection 
measures.  Once sensitized to the specific deterrent effects of matching 
rights, courts should more closely scrutinize the use of matching rights, 
particularly when the right-holder is a financial buyer or the sales process 
demonstrates characteristics of a common value sale.  
 
                                                                                                             
*Assistant Professor of Law, Boston College Law School.  Research for this paper was 
made possible through the support of the BC Law Fund.  Thanks to Steven Davidoff, Michael 
Klausner, and David Walker for their insights on this issue.  Special thanks to Elizabeth D. Johnston 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This Article argues that courts should re-evaluate the emerging legal 
standard governing the use of "matching rights" in merger agreements.  
Matching rights are a deal protection device intended to either deter second 
bidders or ensure that, a second bid having appeared, the initial bidder will 
be advantageously positioned to succeed in completing the acquisition.1  In 
takeover jurisprudence, deal protection devices are subject to an intermediate 
standard of review.2  Boards can remain faithful to their fiduciary obligations 
when they grant potential acquirers these protections, provided such 
protections are "proportionate and 'reasonable in relation to the threat 
posed.'"3  While the courts have been explicit in their application of the 
intermediate standard to certain types of deal protection mechanisms, like 
 
                                                                                                             
1See Brian JM Quinn, Bulletproof: Mandatory Rules for Deal Protection, 32 J. CORP. L. 
865, 870-71 (2007). 
2See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1372 (Del. 1995) (quoting Stroud v. 
Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 92 n.3 (Del. 1992)). 
3See id. at 1379. 
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termination fees,4 in recent years they appear to have adopted a more 
permissive posture with respect to matching rights.5   
Although matching rights are subject to intermediate scrutiny in 
practice, courts appear to apply only a cursory review of the use of matching 
rights as deal protections.6  This may be because the seemingly binary nature 
of matching rights often makes it difficult for courts to engage in the same 
kind of nuanced reasonableness analysis they regularly employ in the 
analysis of other deal protections, like termination fees.  Or perhaps, 
indiscriminate pleading by plaintiffs' counsel has caused courts to become 
inured to the potential costs to shareholders, when a selling board grants 
initial bidders matching rights.  In any event, the evidence from recent 
rulings is that courts view matching rights as no more than common or 
customary deal terms, mere boilerplate, and not a serious deterrent to 
subsequent bids.7  While such terms are in fact commonly found in merger 
agreements, they nevertheless have potentially powerful disincentive effects 
that deserve close scrutiny.  If not, transactional lawyers may misinterpret the 
court's current dismissiveness of plaintiffs' matching right arguments for the 
adoption of a new, bright-line rule favoring the use of matching rights in the 
sale of control context.  
The economic literature on the incentive effects associated with 
matching rights suggests that intermediate scrutiny is an appropriate 
approach to evaluating the use of matching rights.8  In certain circumstances, 
the presence of matching rights may deter some subsequent, higher-valuing, 
bidders and thereby be preclusive.9  In such circumstances, matching rights 
can result in outcomes that are inefficient and undesirable.  In other 
circumstances, matching rights will not necessarily prevent an efficient 
allocation of the seller to its highest and best use, but the presence of 
matching rights can have an impact on the distribution of the surplus 
generated in the transaction.10  In such situations, matching rights can have 
the effect of shifting transaction surplus from the seller to the right-holder.  
In that case, such a result may place directors at odds with their fiduciary 
 
                                                                                                             
4Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 49 (Del. 1994) (discussing 
that termination fees and no-shop provisions are subject to enhanced scrutiny by the judiciary). 
5See In re Toys "R" Us, Inc. S'holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1017 (Del. Ch. 2005) (noting 
that matching rights are a "common contractual feature"). 
6Id. 
7Id. 
8See infra Part III. 
9See infra Part IV. 
10David I. Walker, Rethinking Rights of First Refusal, 5 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 20-21 
(Spring 1999) (discussing how a right of first refusal impacts multiple bidders in an auction). 
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duties in the context of a sale of control.  In both cases, however, it is clear 
that matching rights are not altogether benign contract terms. 
Nevertheless, there are reasonable and valid uses for matching rights.  
For example, matching rights can be a valuable tool for sellers to engage 
potential acquirers.  Because the presence of a matching right may reduce 
the costs of uncertainty for an initial bidder and thus the right may prompt an 
initial bidder to make the transaction-specific investments required to 
prepare an initial bid.11  Such rights can also be useful in ending a played-out 
process of shopping a company or a bidding contest.  Sellers' boards, 
however, must remain attentive to the potential power of matching rights to 
deter subsequent bidders, as well as their potential negative distributive 
impacts on shareholder value at a point in the corporate life when the board 
is charged with securing the highest price reasonably available for selling 
shareholders.12  For their part, courts should be attentive to the potential 
power of these common contractual provisions.  Rather than take a 
dismissive approach to their use, courts should subject board decisions to 
grant matching rights the same highly contextualized analysis that courts 
bring to bear when analyzing other deal protection measures.  Of course, 
while the general framework of analysis is the same for a matching right as it 
is for other deal protections, the economic incentives associated with 
matching rights suggest that courts need to focus on different attributes of 
the matching right and transaction structure to determine the reasonable 
bounds of their use. 
In Part II, this Article places matching rights in context by describing 
them as they appear in merger agreements in their various forms.  Part III 
provides a brief overview of the conclusions one can draw from the 
academic literature on the competitive effects of matching rights.  In 
particular, it notes how the profile of the right-holder affects questions of 
allocative efficiency and distributional fairness.  In Part IV, this Article 
describes the approach taken by courts in their evaluation of the use of 
matching rights in merger agreements.  It then contrasts this permissive 
approach with the highly contextualized approach taken by courts when 
 
                                                                                                             
11Of course, sellers can use a properly priced termination fee to accomplish this same result 
and need not unnecessarily rely on a "belt-and-suspenders" approach to coaxing out an initial bid 
from a hesitant acquirer.  See, e.g., In re Cogent, Inc. S'holder Litig., 7 A.3d 487, 502 (Del. Ch. 
2010) ("[I]n an effort to entice an acquirer to make a strong offer, it is reasonable for a seller to 
provide a buyer some level of assurance that he will be given adequate opportunity to buy the seller, 
even if a higher bid later emerges."). 
12Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (in 
a sale of control context "[t]he directors' role changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to 
auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the company."). 
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evaluating the use of other deal protection measures, such as termination 
fees.  Part V offers a series of considerations that courts might take into 
account when articulating a reasonableness standard for matching rights.  It 
then attempts to provide both courts and transactional lawyers with a 
contextual framework for distinguishing circumstances where matching 
rights may be no more than standard boilerplate from circumstances where 
they may be preclusive and have potentially adverse effects on selling 
shareholders.  
II.  MATCHING RIGHTS IN MERGER AGREEMENTS 
Matching rights are, by now, ubiquitous terms in merger agreements.13 
 They come in multiple forms, but all share two common attributes:  time 
and information.  Matching rights work to create a cushion of time before a 
seller is permitted to terminate the merger agreement with the right-holder to 
pursue a superior offer.14  Matching rights also provide right-holders with 
detailed information about the substance of any competing bid.15  By 
providing the right-holder with information about competing bids and the 
time with which to determine whether or not to meet the second bid, 
matching rights place the right-holder in a superior position relative to 
second bidders.  It is this superior position, with respect to both information 
and time, that is valuable to right-holders and potentially preclusive to 
second bidders. 
Common matching rights include information rights, advance notice 
requirements prior to termination of the merger agreement, and notification 
of any adverse change in the selling board's recommendation or of its 
undertaking consideration of a subsequent offer.16  All of these forms are 
implicit matching rights.  Matching rights also include explicit rights to 
match subsequent offers and requirements that the seller engage in a good 
faith negotiation process with the right-holder.17  In general, each of the 
different forms of matching rights work to generate a significant time delay 
 
                                                                                                             
13See In re Toys "R" Us, Inc. S'holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1017 (Del. Ch. 2005) (noting 
that matching rights are a "common contractual feature"). 
14See, e.g., Mentor Graphics Corp., General Statement of Acquisition of Beneficial 
Ownership (Form SC-13D) [hereinafter Mentor Graphics Agreement], at Exhibit 2, Section 7.1.6 
(May 2, 2002). 
15Id.at Exhibit 2, Section 5.4.2. 
16Id.at Exhibit 2, Section 5.4.2 & 7.1.6; see also NovaMed, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) 
[hereinafter NovaMed Agreement], at Exhibit 2.1, Section 4.2(b) (Jan. 26, 2011). 
17See, e.g., Mentor Graphics Agreement, supra note 14, at Exhibit 2, Section 7.1.6; see also 
NovaMed Agreement, supra note 16, at Exhibit 2.1, Section 4.2(b). 
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between the point at which a subsequent bidder presents a potentially 
superior offer and the point in time when a seller may accept that offer.  
During that intervening period, the right-holder has the opportunity, either 
explicit or implicit, to match a subsequent bidder's offer and prevent the 
seller from accepting the subsequent bid.18  In effect, a matching right makes 
every subsequent bidder a stalking horse.19 
Information rights are the weakest form of matching rights.  
Information rights are best understood as implicit matching rights.  Such 
rights provide that sellers will share information about subsequent bids with 
the initial bidder in the event a second bidder appears.20  In essence, 
information rights permit the right-holder to sit at the table while the seller 
negotiates alternate offers with second bidders.  The effect of information 
rights is to give initial bidders complete information about competing bids in 
near real time, thereby allowing the right-holder sufficient time to evaluate 
competing offers and prepare a counter-offer should she wish to pursue one. 
 Information rights do not necessarily require the seller to engage the right-
holder in additional negotiations.  Rather, they rely on the seller's fiduciary 
duties to ensure that in the event the right-holder wishes to match or exceed 
a competing bid, the seller's board will consider the right-holder's amended 
offer before terminating the initial transaction.21 
Merger agreements also include other implicit matching rights.  As 
with information rights, these other implicit matching rights function as 
circuit-breakers and prevent a hasty termination of the merger agreement in 
 
                                                                                                             
18See, e.g., In re Cogent, Inc. S'holder Litig., 7 A.3d 487, 501-02 (Del. Ch. 2010) (noting 
that the matching rights in this case gave the initial bidder "five days to match or exceed any offer 
the Board deems to be a Superior Proposal"). 
19See, e.g., In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. S'holder Litig., 2011 WL 2028076, at *21 
(Del. Ch. May 20, 2011) (noting that a stalking horse is an initial bid that is designed "to draw others 
into a bidding war"). 
20See, e.g., Mentor Graphics Agreement, supra note 14, at Exhibit 2, Section 5.4.2. 
21The Mentor Graphics Agreement includes a typical information rights provision: 
The Company shall immediately advise Parent of any inquiry received by it relating 
to any potential Acquisition Proposal and of the terms of any proposal or inquiry, 
including the identity of the person and its affiliates making the same, that it may 
receive in respect of any such potential Acquisition Proposal, or of any information 
requested from it or of any negotiations or discussions being sought to be initiated 
with it, shall furnish to the [Parent] a copy of any such proposal or inquiry, if it is 
in writing, or a written summary of any such proposal or inquiry (as well as of any 
additional information received by the Company with respect to an Acquisition 
Proposal), if it is not in writing and shall keep Parent fully informed on a current 
basis with respect to the status of any such negotiations or discussions and any 
developments with respect to the foregoing. 
Id. 
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favor of a subsequent bidder.22  Like information rights, advance notice 
provisions rely on the implicit force of the seller's fiduciary obligations to 
ensure that the right-holder has a final opportunity to match any subsequent 
bid, prior to a seller terminating the merger agreement.  These advance 
notice provisions are typically found in one of three places: (1) the board 
recommendation, (2) the fiduciary termination right, or (3) the non-
solicitation provision.23  When tied to the board recommendation, such 
provisions may require that the seller inform the right-holder of its intention 
to change its recommendation and then wait x days before doing so.  When 
tied to the fiduciary termination right, sellers are permitted to terminate the 
transaction to pursue superior offers, but only after having provided the 
seller with x days prior notice.24  When found in the non-solicitation 
provision, sellers are permitted to negotiate with or respond to an unsolicited 
offer only after providing the right-holder with the specified number of days 
advance notice of their intent to engage in negotiations.25  The effect of 
advance notice provisions, which may also be cumulative, is to create space 
and time for negotiation by preventing a seller from immediately terminating 
the transaction with the right-holder in order to pursue an alternative 
transaction.  Neither advance notice provisions nor information rights create 
contractual rights for the right-holder to match any subsequent offer.  
However, when combined with a seller's fiduciary obligation in the sale of 
control context,26 they do create a real opportunity for the right-holder to 
match any subsequent bid.  
The final form of matching rights is the explicit contractual right or 
the good faith negotiation right.  In their strongest form, these explicit 
matching rights provide the right-holder with a contractual right to match or 
exceed the terms of any subsequent bidder's offer.27  Such provisions may 
also include requirements that the seller engage in good faith negotiations 
with the right-holder for a period of time such that the competing bid no 
 
                                                                                                             
22See, e.g., id. at Exhibit 2, Section 7.1.6. 
23Mentor Graphics also includes an advance notice provision, allowing termination of the 
agreement "[b]y the Company if the Company Board determines to accept a Superior Proposal, but 
only after the Company (A) provides Parent with not less than five business days' notice of its 
determination to accept such Superior Proposal, including all terms thereof . . . ." Mentor Graphics 
Agreement, supra note 14, at Exhibit 2, Section 7.1.6.   
24See id. 
25See, e.g., NovaMed Agreement, supra note 16, at Exhibit 2.1, Section 4.2. 
26Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) 
(noting that in a change of control context a board's duty becomes "the maximization of the 
company's value at a sale for the stockholders' benefit"). 
27See, e.g., In re Cogent, Inc. S'holder Litig., 7 A.3d 487, 501-02 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
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longer constitutes a superior proposal.28  By requiring sellers to engage with 
the right-holder, the explicit matching right ensures that the right-holder will 
always have the final opportunity to accept a subsequent bidder's offer. 
A review of merger agreements for the period January 2002 to 
December 2006, available in the SDC Thomson Mergers and Acquisitions 
database, reveals just how common the various forms of matching rights are 
in acquisitions.29  Some form of matching right was present in just over 
 
                                                                                                             
28Mentor Graphics included the following explicit match right in its acquisition agreement 
with Innoveda, allowing termination: 
By the Company, if the Company Board determines to accept a Superior Proposal, 
but only after the Company . . . (B) within the not less than five business day 
period referred, the Company has and has caused its financial and legal advisors to, 
negotiate with Parent to make such adjustments in the terms and conditions of this 
Agreement with the goal of enabling the Company to proceed with the transactions 
contemplated hereby . . . . 
Mentor Graphics Agreement, supra note 14, at Exhibit 2, Section 7.1.6. 
NovaMed included the following explicit matching right in its acquisition agreement with Surgery 
Center Holdings: 
No Adverse Recommendation Change or termination of this Agreement pursuant 
to this Section 4.2(b) may be made unless (A) the Board of Directors shall have 
first provided prior written notice to Parent that it is prepared to (I) effect an 
Adverse Recommendation Change (an "Adverse Recommendation Change 
Notice") or (II) terminate this Agreement pursuant to this Section 4.2(b) in 
response to a Superior Proposal (a "Superior Proposal Notice"), which notice shall 
contain a description of the material terms and conditions of such Superior 
Proposal (including the identity of the bidder and a copy of the definitive 
Acquisition Agreement for such Superior Proposal in the form to be entered into), 
together with any information required to be delivered to Parent concurrently 
therewith pursuant to Section 4.2(a) and (B) Parent does not make, within three 
Business Days after the receipt of such notice (the "Notice Period"), a proposal that 
would, in the reasonable good faith judgment of the Board of Directors of the 
Company (after consultation with its outside legal counsel and financial advisor), 
cause the offer previously constituting a Superior Proposal to no longer constitute a 
Superior Proposal.  The Company agrees to negotiate in good faith with Parent 
during any Notice Period to allow Parent to match or better any Superior Proposal 
(as amended).  Any changes to the financial terms or any change to other material 
terms of such Superior Proposal occurring prior to the Company's effecting an 
Adverse Recommendation Change or terminating this Agreement pursuant to this 
Section 4.2(b) shall require the Company to provide to Parent a new Adverse 
Recommendation Change Notice or Superior Proposal Notice and a new Notice 
Period and to comply with the requirements of this Section 4.2(b) with respect to 
each such new written notice. 
NovaMed Agreement, supra note 16, at Exhibit 2.1, Section 4.2(b). 
29A review of cash transactions greater than $75 million and excluding transactions in 
bankruptcy, transactions for less than 100% interests, all hostile or unsolicited offers, and 
transactions involving a controlling shareholder, provides a sample of 331 transactions.  SDC 
Platinum, Thomson Reuters Financial Database, http://thomsonreuters.com/products_services/ 
financial/financial_products/a-z/sdc/. 
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ninety-nine percent of all transactions in the sample.30  Simple information 
rights, the weakest form of matching right, were present in approximately 
ninety-eight percent of all transactions in the sample.31  Seventy-five percent 
of transactions in the sample had some form of notice requirement in 
advance of a change in the seller's board recommendation.32  Less common, 
but still found widely, were provisions providing advance notice ahead of 
negotiations with third parties (twenty-one percent) as well as provisions 
providing advance notice ahead of termination (twenty-eight percent).33  
Forty-one percent of transactions in the sample provided the right-holder 
with an explicit right to match any superior offer, while fifty-four percent of 
transactions included a requirement that the seller negotiate in good faith 
with the right-holder in the event the seller received a superior offer.34  Many 
transactions relied on multiple combinations of protection through a belt-
and-suspenders approach to matching rights, examples include information 
rights and advance notice provisions as well as explicit matching rights.  
The ubiquity of matching rights, in their various forms, begs the 
question:  what purpose do they serve?  On the one hand, such provisions 
may be no more than mere boilerplate provisions found in all merger 
agreements with no meaningful effect and not worthy of analysis.35  This is 
the general approach that courts have adopted towards these rights—that 
they are surplus and not language with any real economic effect.36  A board 
reading recent court rulings might not be faulted if, in good faith, it 
misinterprets the court's permissive approach to matching rights as admitting 
a per se validity of such provisions.  On the other hand, it is precisely 
because these provisions are ubiquitous that they deserve closer scrutiny.  It 
may well be that these rights find themselves in most agreements because 
they are not mere surplus.  To that end, it may be that they have preclusive 
effects that need to be accounted for in the legal doctrine.  Absent a more 
contextualized approach to analyzing matching rights in the context of a sale 
of control, it is possible that a board, acting in good faith, could mistakenly 
grant unreasonable defensive measures. 
 
                                                                                                             
30See infra Appendix. 
31See infra Appendix. 
32See infra Appendix. 
33See infra Appendix. 
34See infra Appendix. 
35See In re Toys "R" Us, Inc. S'holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1017 (Del. Ch. 2005) (noting 
that matching rights are a "common contractual feature"). 
36Id. 
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III.  THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF MATCHING RIGHTS AND DEAL 
PROTECTIONS 
Deal protection measures, like termination fees, stock lockups, and 
matching rights among others, have been the subject of much study.37  Such 
measures may be highly problematic.  When granted to initial bidders, deal 
protections can have the effect of inducing a potential bidder to move from 
indifference to making a bid and in that way increase joint value.38  On the 
other hand, when deal protections granted to initial bidders are excessive, 
potentially higher-valuing subsequent bidders may be deterred from entering 
into a bidding contest.39  The ultimate outcome may be that the seller ends up 
in the hands of a lower-valuing bidder, resulting in an inefficient allocation 
of resources; or, excessive protections may result in a distribution of 
transaction surplus away from selling shareholders at a point in the corporate 
life when directors have a special obligation to be concerned with the 
distributional effects of a sale.40  Legal standards play an important role in 
finding the proper balance between the level of deal protections sufficient to 
induce an initial bid and those that preclude the corporation from ending up 
in the hands of a higher-valuing subsequent bidder.  
Termination fees, stock lockups, and topping fees, among others, fall 
into a general category of deal protections that are compensatory in nature.41  
These deal protections have dual functions:  they compensate initial bidders 
for the opportunity costs of their bidding and, when large enough, they work 
 
                                                                                                             
37See Ian Ayres, Analyzing Stock Lock-Ups: Do Target Treasury Sales Foreclose or 
Facilitate Takeover Auctions?, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 682, 683 (1990); John C. Coates IV & Guhan 
Subramanian, A Buy-Side Model of M&A Lockups: Theory and Evidence, 53 STAN. L. REV. 307, 
310-13 (2000); Sean J. Griffith, Deal Protection Provisions in the Last Period of Play, 71 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1899, 1904-06 (2003); Micah S. Officer, Termination Fees in Mergers and 
Acquisitions, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 431, 432-33 (2003); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Categorical Confusion: Deal 
Protection Measures in Stock-for-Stock Merger Agreements, 56 BUS. LAW. 919, 932-33 (2001). 
38Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Lockups and the Market for Corporate Control, 48 
STAN. L. REV. 1539, 1547 (1996). 
39See, e.g., Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 49 (Del. 1994) 
(noting that the excessive deal protections in this case made the company "less attractive to other 
bidders"). 
40In the last period of play, the directors have an obligation not necessarily to seek the most 
economically efficient transaction, but rather seek the transaction that results in the highest possible 
percentage of the surplus generated in the transaction to the selling shareholders.  Revlon, Inc. v. 
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) ("The directors' role changed 
from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the 
stockholders at a sale of the company."). 
41Quinn, supra note 1, at 871 (describing the various categories of compensatory deal 
protection devices). 
2011] RE-EVALUATING THE EMERGING STANDARD OF REVIEW 1021 
to deter subsequent bidders.42  The compensatory function is a common 
rationalization for the use of termination fees in merger agreements.43  Unless 
the initial bidder has sufficient assurances that it will be able to consummate 
the proposed transaction, bidders may be dissuaded from undertaking the 
transaction-specific investments required to generate a bid and otherwise 
valuable transactions might not go forward.  Compensatory devices are 
required to cover the initial bidder's transaction-specific search costs.44   
Compensatory devices can play an important role in inducing an 
initial bidder to make the transaction-specific investments required to make a 
bid on a potential target.45  When the size of the termination fee or stock 
lockup is set at reasonable levels, roughly equivalent to the opportunity costs 
of the initial bidders, initial bidders should be indifferent with respect to the 
prospect of a subsequent bidding contest.46  Termination fees often play this 
role in the bankruptcy setting by compensating the bid costs of a stalking 
horse bidder in order to generate a competitive sale of the corporation.47  
When reasonably priced, termination fees and stock lockups can generate 
real value for shareholders.48  Termination fees or stock lockups can be used 
by selling boards to induce second bidders to participate in an auction.49  If 
used as incentives to bring second bids, compensatory devices can play an 
 
                                                                                                             
42Id. 
43See, e.g., Thomas A. Swett, Merger Termination Fees After Bell Atlantic: Applying a 
Liquidated Damages Analysis to Termination Fee Provisions, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 341, 355 
(1999). 
44Such costs include those of identifying and evaluating potential targets and putting 
together a valuable bid.  Id. 
45See Ayres, supra note 37, at 698 (analyzing the incentive effects of stock lockups); Kahan 
& Klausner, supra note 38, at 1547 (arguing that lockups can increase a bidder's profit and hence 
induce a party to bid). 
46See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 38, at 1548. 
47See, e.g., Paul B. Lackey, An Empirical Survey and Proposed Bankruptcy Code Section 
Concerning the Propriety of Bidding Incentives in a Bankruptcy Sale of Assets, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 
720, 722 (1993) (discussing the use of termination fees as bidding incentives). 
48See Timothy R. Burch, Locking Out Rival Bidders: The Use of Lockup Options in 
Corporate Mergers, 60 J. FIN. ECON. 103, 110 (2001); see also Thomas W. Bates & Michael L. 
Lemmon, Breaking Up is Hard to Do? An Analysis of Termination Fee Provisions and Merger 
Outcomes, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 469, 499-501 (2003) (noting that lockups and termination fees are 
associated with higher returns for selling shareholders).  
49When used to induce a second bidder, the seller agrees to pay the bidding costs of a 
second bidder in the event a bidder enters a bidding contest and is unsuccessful.  Although such 
strategies are common in other settings, in real-world mergers and acquisitions such strategies are 
rare.  Kahan & Klausner, supra note 38, at 1552-53; see also Yeon-Koo Che & Tracy R. Lewis, The 
Role of Lockups in Takeover Contests, 38 RAND J. ECON. 648, 650 (2007) (noting that without a 
lockup "a second buyer may not compete against a better-informed first bidder").  
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important role in encouraging the efficient allocation of resources and 
increase value for selling shareholders.50   
Though compensatory devices can have the salutary effects described 
above, when excessive, they can also have potentially adverse effects.  When 
termination fees and stock lockups are sufficiently large, they may deter 
second bidders from participating in a bidding contest.51  It is the potential 
deterrent power of these compensatory deal protections that gives them force 
as deal protection measures.52  The deterrent potential of excessively large 
termination fees is well understood and serves as a primary motivation for 
the legal constraints on their use in the context of a corporate sale.53  Where 
such fees become so large as to preclude second bidders, they may be 
unreasonable and invite intervention from the courts.54 
While termination fees and stock lockups are compensatory in nature, 
matching rights are not intended to provide direct compensation for a jilted 
initial bidder.  Rather, matching rights serve an exclusivity function.55  The 
matching right's exclusivity function provides the right-holder with a degree 
of assurance that its transaction-specific investments will not be lost because 
the seller is constrained in its ability to use the initial bid to shop for a higher 
offer.56  By assuring the initial bidder always has a last look, matching rights 
are a contractual means by which parties attempt to manage "foreseeable, but 
unpredictable, changes in business relationships," specifically the 
foreseeable, but unexpected, appearance of a second bidder.57  By 
maintaining the exclusivity of the relationship between the right-holder and 
the seller, the matching rights raise the probability that the right-holder's bid 
will succeed.58 
Because matching rights put the right-holder in a preferred 
informational position relative to subsequent bidders, such rights can place 
 
                                                                                                             
50Kahan & Klausner, supra note 38, at 1553. 
51Id. at 1548 n.28. 
52Quinn, supra note 1, at 870. 
53See, e.g., McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492, 505-06 (Del. Ch. 2000); see also 
Coates & Subramanian, supra note 37, at 331 (discussing the increased usage and size of 
termination fees); Shmuel Leshem, A Signaling Theory of Termination Fees in Mergers 3 (Am. Law 
& Econ. Ass'n Annual Meetings, Working Paper No. 45, 2006) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=770388 (discussing the substantial effects 
termination fees have on the bidding process). 
54See In re Dollar Thrifty S'holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 613 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
55Quinn, supra note 1, at 870. 
56Id. 
57Walker, supra note 10, at 10. 
58See Sushil Bikhchandani et al., On the Right-of-First-Refusal, 5 ADVANCES 
THEORETICAL ECON. 1, 10 (2005). 
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subsequent bidders at a significant disadvantage and thereby deter 
subsequent bids.59  The work of theoretical economists with respect to the 
incentive effects of matching rights provides insights into situations where 
one can expect subsequent bidders to be the most disadvantaged.60  More 
important from the perspective of sellers, economists point out situations 
where sellers should expect the presence of a matching right to work to their 
disadvantage with respect to the distribution of the joint gains from a 
transaction with the right-holder.61  In particular, the nature of the sales 
process and the bidders has an effect on the potential deterrent impact of a 
matching right and the distribution of transactional surplus a seller can 
expect when granting one.62   
First, however, there are circumstances in which one can expect a 
matching right to generate joint value for the right-holder and the seller.63  To 
the extent a matching right induces a bidder to make an initial bid, the 
matching right can create joint value for both the right-holder and the seller.64 
 The joint value created by the right is equal to the right-holder's private 
valuation of the seller, with those benefits distributed to the right-holder in 
the amount equal to the difference between the right-holder's private 
valuation and the price offered by the right-holder for the seller.65  The right-
holder will exercise her right only in the event a second bidder offers a 
higher price than the right-holder's initial bid, but lower than the right-
 
                                                                                                             
59Quinn, supra note 1, at 870. 
60See Walker, supra note 10, at 17-18; Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, Why Do Sellers 
(Usually) Prefer Auctions?, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 1544, 1566 (2009). 
61Although theoretical work with respect to the incentive effects of matching rights is still 
nascent, there is a growing interest in this question.  See Marcel Kahan et al., Rights of First Refusal 
11 (N.Y.U. Ctr. for Law, Econ. and Org., Working Paper No. 07-42, 2007) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1029313; Leandro Arozamena & Federico 
Weinschelbaum, A Note on the Suboptimality of Right-of-First-Refusal clauses, 4 ECON. BULL. 1, 4 
(2006);  Bikhchandani et al., supra note 58, at 2; Bulow & Klemperer, supra note 60, at 1566; 
Albert H. Choi, A Rent Extraction Theory of Right of First Refusal, 57 J. INDUS. ECON. 252, 263 
(2009); Brit Grosskopf & Alvin E. Roth, If You Are Offered the Right of First Refusal, Should You 
Accept? An Investigation of Contract Design, 65 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 176, 178 (2009); Hayley 
H. Chouinard, Auctions With and Without the Right of First Refusal and National Park Service 
Concession Contracts, 87 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1083, 1087 (2005); R. Preston McAfee & John 
McMillan, Auctions and Bidding, 25 J. ECON. LIT. 699, 714 (1987); Walker, supra note 10, at 26; 
Marcel Kahan, An Economic Analysis of Rights of First Refusal 8 (NYC Ctr. for Law and Bus., 
Working Paper No. CLB-99-009, 1999) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=11382. 
62See Walker, supra note 10, at 20-21. 
63Choi, supra note 61, at 263. 
64See Bikhchandani et al., supra note 58, at 25. 
65See Kahan et al., supra note 61, at 14-15. 
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holder's private valuation for the seller.66  In the event a second bidder 
appears with a higher private valuation for the seller and bids in excess of 
the right-holder's valuation, then the right-holder will not exercise her right.67 
In that event, the joint value will increase to equal the second offer.  The 
effect of the second bid in this case is to improve the distribution of joint 
profits in favor of the seller.68  Note that the distributional improvement is a 
function of the seller being able to attract an additional bidder and not the 
presence of the matching right per se.69  
A.  Private Value Setting—Potential for Inefficient Allocation 
In the private value setting the seller does not have an objective value; 
rather, it has different, or private, values for each of the potential acquirers.70 
For example, transactions involving strategic buyers often resemble private 
value deals.71  Strategic buyers often envision combining the seller's assets as 
complements with their own to generate synergistic value for the buyer.72  
Consequently, each bidder knows only her valuation of the seller and that 
value differs with each bidder.73   
Although matching rights in private value settings create joint value 
for the right-holder and the seller, in some circumstances it is possible that 
the presence of a matching right could result in a lower joint profit than 
might be optimal and represent an inefficient allocation of the seller to less 
than the highest valuing bidder.74  An inefficient allocation is possible in two 
ways.  First, an inefficient allocation can occur when the highest valuing 
bidder does not have a materially higher private valuation of the seller than 
 
                                                                                                             
66See Walker, supra note 10, at 19. 
67See id. 
68Choi, supra note 61, at 254.  Joint value does not address distributional questions with 
respect to the distribution of the transaction surplus between the right-holder and the seller. 
69This is consistent with Bulow and Klemperer's observation that an English auction with 
n+1 bidders will always return a better result for sellers than any other optimal auction structure.  
Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, Auctions Versus Negotiations, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 180, 181 
(1996).  Bikchandani et al. observe that the seller cannot adequately negotiate a fee for the matching 
right to compensate for this distributional result.  Bikhchandani et al., supra note 58, at 4. 
70See McAfee & McMillan, supra note 61, at 704-05.  
71Quinn, supra note 1, at 871. 
72See Coates & Subramanian, supra note 37, at 372. 
73McAfee & McMillan, supra note 61, at 704-05 (describing the private value auction 
setting). 
74Choi, supra note 61, at 255 (citing Bikhchandani et al., supra note 58, at 9).  Arozamena 
and Weinschelbaum come to a more extreme conclusion.  They show that under no circumstances 
where there are bidders with independent private values can we expect a matching right to maximize 
the joint surplus of the buyer and seller.  Arozamena & Weinschelbaum, supra note 61, at 4. 
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the right-holder or other potential bidders.75  Sushil Bikhchandani, Steven A. 
Lippman, and Reade Ryan show the presence of matching rights can deter 
incremental bidding and result in a right-holder—though not the highest 
valuing bidder—winning a sale.76  Although a matching right can deter 
incremental bidding and thus at times lead to potentially inefficient 
allocation results, matching rights have not been shown to deter a risk 
neutral bidder with a materially higher private valuation. 
Second, an inefficient allocation can occur if a risk-averse higher 
valuing bidder declines to bid in the face of a matching right.77  Remember 
that private valuations are known only to the bidders and in the extreme case 
are not correlated among bidders.78  At the same time, in an ascending price 
auction, initial bids are not necessarily correlated with private valuations.  In 
the event the right-holder offers a low-ball initial bid, risk-averse second 
bidders with a materially higher valuation may decline to bid if the second 
bidder believes the right-holder's private valuation is higher.79  The 
likelihood of such a deterrent is difficult to assess in the private value setting. 
It is likely affected by a number of factors, including the costs of preparing a 
bid, whether or not the risk-averse second bidder can be compensated for 
those costs, the amount and quality of publicly available information about 
the seller, as well as the reputation of the right-holder in bidding contests 
among many others.80 
 
                                                                                                             
75See, e.g., Bikhchandani et al., supra note 58, at 3. 
76Id. at 9.  Bikchandani concludes that the presence of a matching right converts a second 
price auction into a third price auction, thus permitting the right-holder to acquire the seller even 
when it is not the highest valuing bidder.  First, the matching right:  
[C]onverts the second price auction into something better than a third price auction 
for the [right-holder].  Upon winning the object, she pays the second highest 
among the others' bids; moreover, she may win the object even if her signal is less 
than the second highest signal of the other buyers.  Second, from a regular buyer's 
standpoint, the presence of a [right-holder] converts a second price auction with 
n+1 buyers into something worse than a second price auction with n buyers.  When 
a regular buyer, say buyer 1, wins the object, he pays the highest among the other 
(regular) buyers' bids; but he wins only if his signal is higher than the signals of 
[other buyers] and is sufficiently higher than the [right-holder's] signal.  Third, the 
allocation of the object may be inefficient because, as already noted, the [right-
holder] may purchase the object even when she does not have the highest 
signal . . . . 
Id.  Bikhchandani's conclusion is consistent with other work.  See Walker, supra note 10, at 26; 
Kahan et al., supra note 61, at 10; Choi, supra note 61, at 262. 
77See id. at 10. 
78McAfee & McMillan, supra note 61, at 705. 
79However, a higher valuing second bidder who is risk neutral can be expected to bid in the 
face of a lowball bid.  Risk averse second bidders can be enticed into bidding through the allocation 
of expense reimbursements or second bidder termination fees. See id. at 719-20. 
80See Kahan et al., supra note 61, at 19. 
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The presence of a matching right, however, can in some circumstances 
lead to an inefficient allocation of the seller to the lower valuing right-holder, 
including where the second bidders do not have materially higher private 
valuations than the seller or when the second bidders are risk-averse.81  For 
these reasons, economists caution "[matching rights] should be explained by 
reasons beyond the simple one-time interaction between the seller and a 
favored buyer, and should not be awarded lightly by sellers."82  Because of 
their potential for adverse economic incentives in some situations, economic 
analysis suggests that matching rights are anything but standard terms.83 
Of course, where a bidder with a private value for the seller is risk 
neutral, the presence of a matching right is not necessarily a deterrent to a 
subsequent bid.84  This is true even if the second bidder's private valuation is 
lower than the right-holder's private valuation, provided the second bidder's 
valuation is higher than the right-holder's initial bid.85  For risk neutral 
private value bidders, the optimal bidding strategy will always be to bid 
when the bid is less than their private valuation.  The presence, or absence, 
of a matching right is not relevant to a risk neutral private value bidder.86  
B.  Common Value Setting Adversely Affects Selling Shareholders 
Although pure common value auctions are rare, many transaction 
structures demonstrate important aspects of common value auctions.  In the 
common value setting, the seller has a single objective value for all bidders.87 
Bidders, however, have different information about the seller, which affects 
their estimates of the seller's objective value.88  Bidders with more, or more 
accurate, information are likely to have a better sense of the seller's objective 
value.  Their bids are more likely to be closer to the true objective value of 
the seller than bidders with less or lower quality information.89  Thus, in the 
common value setting one can expect a distribution of estimates around the 
mean with fifty percent of bidders overestimating the objective value of the 
seller. 
 
                                                                                                             
81See Bikhchandani et al., supra note 58, at 3, 10. 
82Arozamena & Weinschelbaum, supra note 61, at 4. 
83See Bikhchandani et al., supra note 58, at 1. 
84Quinn, supra note 1, at 871. 
85See Bikhchandani et al., supra note 58, at 15. 
86See Quinn, supra note 1, at 870-71. 
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When a firm is sold to private equity or other financial bidders such 
transactions exhibit many attributes of a common value sale.90  The financing 
model that drives such transactions does not rely on the acquirer and the 
seller to generate synergies.91  Rather, the financing model generates value 
from leverage and cash flow without respect to the idiosyncratic nature of 
the seller's business.92  To the degree any target represents just a stream of 
cash flows that can be accessed to repay the debt required to finance the 
acquisition, such transactions exhibit characteristics of common value sales.  
Because the value of a seller in the common value setting is 
objectively the same for all potential bidders, the presence of a matching 
right should have a number of important effects.  First, the presence of a 
matching right will not prevent the seller from allocating it to its best and 
highest use.93  Second, to the extent a subsequent bidder enters into a bidding 
contest for the seller, the second bidder risks falling victim to the winner's 
curse problem.94  Assuming that the right-holder has the best quality 
information about the seller, non-right-holders will never succeed in buying 
without over-bidding.95  Third, the presence of a matching right in the hands 
of an initial common value bidder will deter other common value bidders 
from making bids.96  Financial buyers have a well-known aversion for 
engaging in bidding contests.97  Consequently, it appears that the threat of the 
winner's curse is at least implicitly understood by market participants.  
Finally, the direct effect of the matching rights in the context of a common 
value auction is to appropriate transaction gains from the seller to the right-
holder.98  Because other market participants are hesitant to offer topping bids 
 
                                                                                                             
90Quinn, supra note 1, at 871. 
91See id. at 883. 
92Id. 
93McAfee & McMillan, supra note 61, at 705. 
94Paul Milgrom, Auctions and Bidding: A Primer, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 1989, at 3, 4 
(1989) (describing the "winner's curse" resulting from the winner underestimating the cost 
associated with completing the transaction); see also JOHN H. KAGEL & DAN LEVIN, COMMON 
VALUE AUCTIONS AND THE WINNER'S CURSE 2 (2002) ("[Y]ou only win when your estimate 
happens to be the highest . . . result[ing] in winning bids that produce below normal or even negative 
profits."). 
95See Walker, supra note 10, at 18 (noting that an outside bidder with an informational 
disadvantage "faces serious obstacles to winning a contest . . . even if no right of first refusal 
exists"). 
96Quinn, supra note 1, at 870. 
97See, e.g., infra note 176. 
98This phenomena is most commonly seen in the consumer contexts where retailers offer to 
"beat any price" for a consumer good.  Rather than guarantee low prices, in the retail context the 
low-price guarantee strategy permits sellers to price discriminate between informed and uninformed 
consumers.  Competitors have little incentive to compete on low prices because the low-price 
guarantee ensures that low prices will be met.  Thus, the low-price guarantee strategy assures only 
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in the common value context, this permits the right-holder to offer low-ball 
bids and thereby extract transaction surplus at the expense of selling 
shareholders.99  This expected result should have important implications for 
selling boards tasked with attempting to secure the highest price reasonably 
available upon a change in control. 
As amongst common value bidders, society should be agnostic as to 
the ultimate identity of the winner of any bidding contest.  Each of the 
bidders in a sale that has common value attributes will be an equally efficient 
user of the asset after sale.  Consequently, the matching right plays only a 
distributive function.  The common value bidder is able to create private 
value by offering a bid lower than its full valuation of the seller.100  The 
matching right creates the space for a common value right-holder to create 
private value.  By eliminating or reducing the likelihood of competition, the 
right-holder is able to appropriate the transaction surplus to itself.101  
Although matching rights in the common value setting can still improve joint 
value, as between the right-holder and the seller, the right-holder can be 
expected to appropriate much of the gains from the transaction at the 
expense of the selling shareholders.102  
The distributive effects of matching rights when the sale process 
demonstrates common value attributes raises serious questions.  In a sale of 
control, corporate boards are tasked with directing their efforts to achieve the 
highest price reasonably available to shareholders.103  Granting a common 
value bidder a matching right has the affect of deterring subsequent common 
value bidders and shifts transaction surplus to the right-holder at the expense 
of selling shareholders.  A court could find that granting matching rights in 
such a circumstance does not reasonably advance the cause of seeking the 
highest price reasonably available for selling shareholders.  
                                                                                                             
higher prices than in the equilibrium where sellers do not pursue a low-price guarantee strategy.  
Aaron S. Edlin, Do Guaranteed-Low-Price Policies Guarantee High Prices, and Can Antitrust Rise 
to the Challenge?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 528, 530-32 (1997); see also Subhasish Dugar, Price-
Matching Guarantees and Equilibrium Selection in a Homogenous Product Market: An 
Experimental Study, 30 REV. INDUS. ORG. 107, 116 (2007) (finding that price matching guarantees 
facilitate collusion among sellers); Shakun Datta Mago & Jennifer G. Pate, An Experimental 
Examination of Competitor-Based Price Matching Guarantees, 70 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 342, 
350 (2009) (concluding that when costs are symmetric, price matching guarantees significantly 
increase market prices). 
99Quinn, supra note 1, at 876. 
100See Kahan et al., supra note 61, at 14. 
101See id. 
102See Walker, supra note 10, at 20-21. 
103McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492, 502 (Del. Ch. 2000) ("Once a board of 
directors determines to sell the corporation . . . their responsibility is to endeavor to secure the 
highest value reasonably attainable for the stockholders."). 
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IV.  THE EMERGING DE FACTO LEGAL STANDARD FOR MATCHING RIGHTS 
Since at least 2001, when shareholders challenged Pennaco Energy's 
sale to Marathon Oil, courts have been asked regularly to rule on the 
question of whether, in the particular circumstances of a sale of control, 
matching rights in their various forms are unreasonable deal protections.104  
The courts' consistent answer has been no.105  Notwithstanding the growing 
body of economic literature to the contrary,106 courts appear to view matching 
rights as nothing more than "modest and reasonable"107 deal protections that 
are "standard merger terms"108 and "common contractual feature[s]"109 in the 
context of a sale of control.  Although the language of a heightened 
reasonableness review remains intact, courts may have become inured to the 
use of matching rights.110  In fact, courts appear to have adopted a permissive 
approach to board decisions to grant matching rights in merger agreements.111 
This permissive approach is not entirely consistent with the highly 
contextualized analysis that courts bring to bear in evaluating other deal 
protection measures, such as termination fees.112  When evaluating 
termination fees, courts appear quite concerned with the levels and methods 
of calculating the appropriate size of the termination fee granted by the 
selling board before passing judgment on a fee's reasonableness.113  To the 
 
                                                                                                             
104In re Pennaco Energy, Inc. S'holders Litig., 787 A.2d 691, 707 (Del. Ch. 2001) (rejecting 
plaintiff's challenge that the combination of termination fees and matching rights were anything 
more than modest deal protection measures). 
105Id. at 705. 
106See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
107Pennaco Energy, 787 A.2d at 707. 
108In re 3Com S'holders Litig., 2009 WL 5173804, at *7 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2009). 
109In re Toys "R" Us, Inc. S'holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1017 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
110Id. at 1000-01. 
111Even when courts have used their authority to enjoin the application of matching rights as 
deal protection measures, they have not done so because of a recognition of the potential 
unreasonableness of the matching rights themselves.  For example, in Del Monte, the deal protection 
measures were invalidated by the court.  In re Del Monte Foods Co. S'holders Litig., 2011 WL 
532014,  at *24 (Del. Ch. Feb. 14, 2011).  The court was, however, less concerned about the 
preclusive effect of the matching right than it was the inadequacy of the sales process leading up to 
the granting of the deal protections including the match right:  "These measures are not being 
enjoined because they coerce stockholders, preclude any alternative to the board's chosen 
transaction, or otherwise fall outside the range of reasonableness . . . .  If included in an arms' length 
deal untainted by self-interest, the defensive measures would be quite reasonable." Id. 
112See, e.g., In re Dollar Thrifty S'holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 613 (Del. Ch. 2010) 
(evaluating the termination fee by examining the value of the merger, bidder's intent, share price, 
stock dividends, and bidder competition).  
113See Toys "R" Us, 877 A.2d at 1021-1022 (citing Chancellor Chandler in Phelps Dodge 
condemning unreasonably high termination fees as "a more than reasonably explicable barrier to a 
second bidder."). 
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extent transactional lawyers take their cues from court decisions, they may 
misinterpret the lack of a searching analysis of matching rights for license to 
increase reliance on them in deal-making, thereby increasing the amount and 
degree of exclusivity protection included when a seller is negotiating a sale 
of control.114 
A.  Legal Standards with Respect to Deal Protections 
When courts evaluate board decisions to adopt deal protection 
measures, reasonableness is the touchstone.  The reasonableness standard 
takes the form of the intermediate standard: deal protections must be 
"reasonable in relation to the threat posed" by a subsequent higher bid.115  By 
now, the identification of a "threat" to corporate policy has devolved into 
merely a perfunctory exercise of recitation of common threats.116  However, 
the court must also determine whether the deal protections adopted by the 
board are proportionate to the threat posed.  Deal protections are not 
proportionate if they are "draconian, by being either preclusive or 
coercive."117  If the challenged deal protections are not draconian, the court 
must still determine that the deal protections lie "within a range of 
reasonable responses to the threat" before they pass muster under 
intermediate scrutiny and the board’s decision to grant them receives the 
presumption of business judgment.118  
Board decisions to grant initial bidders deal protections in the sale of 
control context are measured against this highly contextualized intermediate 
standard.119  In a sale of control boards "have the obligation of acting 
 
                                                                                                             
114Profs. Coates and Subramanian argue that transactional lawyers tend to read too much 
into Delaware decisions regarding deal protections and in that way push the envelope.  Coates & 
Subramanian, supra note 37, at 336-37. 
115Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del. 1985); see also Unitrin, 
Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1385-86 (Del. 1995) (setting out the intermediate standard); 
Capital City Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 796 (Del. Ch. 1988) (overruled by 
Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989)) (calling Unocal "the most 
innovative and promising case in our recent corporate law"). 
116This was not always the case.  In Capital City, Vice Chancellor Allen attempted to 
provide some substance to proportionality review, but this attempt was rebuffed by the Supreme 
Court.  See Time, 571 A.2d at 1152; see also Ronald J. Gilson and Reinwer Kraakman, 
Delaware’s Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality 
Review, 44 BUS. LAW. 247, 248 (1989) (arguing for a more nuanced approach to the 
intermediate standard).  
117Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1367. 
118Id. 
119This standard does not consist of a series of bright-line rules leading a maximization 
exercise.  Rather, the court is tasked with answering the question:  whether "directors made a 
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reasonably to seek the transaction offering the best value reasonably 
available to the stockholders."120  This duty does not establish any bright-line 
rules or checklist for directors to prove that they fulfilled their duties.121  
Rather, courts "will apply enhanced scrutiny to ensure that the directors have 
acted reasonably."122  Directors in the sale of control context bear the burden 
of proving: (1) they were informed and utilized a reasonable decision-
making process; and (2) they acted reasonably in light of the circumstances 
at the time of their decision.123   
Taken together, the intermediate standard in the change of control 
context is a highly contextualized analysis of the reasonableness of board 
decisions.  The courts recognize that "in cases where the board failed to 
demonstrate that its defensive measures were reasonable and not draconian, 
it seems highly unlikely that the board could show that those measures were, 
nonetheless, 'fair'" under the more exacting Revlon standard.124  In that sense, 
resolution of the question of the reasonableness of deal protection measures 
under the intermediate standard can be determinative of the outcome. 
With respect to compensatory devices in a sale of control,  the highly 
contextualized standard permits initial bidders to recoup the costs of their 
initial bid through a termination fee.  The size of such fees is limited by a 
reasonableness analysis similar to that employed in reviewing the 
reasonableness of liquidated damages provisions in other contractual 
settings.125  In Louisiana Municipal Police Employees' Retirement System v. 
Crawford, the court provided some additional context for its reasonableness 
analysis.126  While not ruling on the question, the court dismissed attempts by 
defendant directors to have the court accept a three percent termination fee 
as a presumptively valid "customary" deal term.127  The court noted the 
complexity of the task involved in passing judgment on such measures in the 
sale of control context.128  The court also warned against adopting a "bright 
                                                                                                             
reasonable decision, not a perfect decision" when seeking the highest price reasonably available for 
shareholders. Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del. 1994). 
120Id. at 43.  
121Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989) ("[T]here is no single 
blueprint that a board must follow to fulfill its [fiduciary] duties."). 
122QVC, 637 A.2d at 43.  
123Id. at 45. 
124William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Function Over Form: A 
Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287, 1311 
(2001). 
125Brazen v. Bell Atl. Corp., 695 A.2d 43, 47-48 (Del. 1997) (treating termination fees 
like liquidated damages). 
126918 A.2d 1172, 1181 n.10 (Del. Ch. 2007).  
127Id. 
128Id. (noting that the inquiry is "by its very nature fact intensive, [and] cannot be reduced to 
a mathematical equation").  Thus, the court could not establish a "blanket rule."  Id. 
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line rule" based on some predetermined understanding of a "naturally 
occurring rate of deal protection" measures.129  The reasonableness analysis 
that a court must engage in requires a close examination of the facts and 
circumstances faced by boards when they decide to grant termination fees to 
initial bidders.130  For example, the court noted that any determination of 
reasonableness of a deal protection requires the court to: 
consider a number of factors, including without limitation: the 
overall size of the termination fee, as well as its percentage 
value; the benefit to shareholders, including a premium (if any) 
that directors seek to protect; the absolute size of the 
transaction, as well as the relative size of the partners to the 
merger; the degree to which a counterparty found such 
protections to be crucial to the deal, bearing in mind 
differences in bargaining power; and the preclusive or coercive 
power of all deal protections included in a transaction, taken as 
a whole.  The inquiry, by its very nature fact intensive, cannot 
be reduced to a mathematical equation.  Though a "3% rule" 
for termination fees might be convenient for transaction 
planners, it is simply too blunt an instrument, too subject to 
abuse, for this Court to bless as a blanket rule.131 
In a later decision, reviewing the appropriateness of termination fees 
as deal protection measures, the court's analysis noted the importance of the 
potentially preclusive effects of such provisions by stating:  "[t]he preclusive 
aspect of any termination fee is properly measured by the effect it would 
have on the desire of any potential bidder to make a topping bid."132  A 
termination fee that is large enough to deter subsequent bids may be held to 
be preclusive and therefore unreasonable.133  Unreasonable deal protection 
measures will fail to pass muster under Delaware's intermediate standard.134 
 
                                                                                                             
129Crawford, 918 A.2d at 1181 n.10 (citing In re Toys "R" Us, Inc. S'holder Litig., 877 
A.2d 975, 1016 (Del. Ch. 2005)). 
130Id. 
131Id. 
132In re Dollar Thrifty S'holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 613 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
133See, e.g., McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492, 506-07 n.65 (Del. Ch. 2000). 
134See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (requiring that 
a board's actions not be "draconian" and that they are "reasonable in relation to the threat posed" 
before getting the protection of the business judgment rule); see also Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. 
Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1385 (Del. 1995) (noting that a board's actions will pass enhanced scrutiny if 
it was "one of several reasonable alternatives"). 
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Of course, the mere fact that a termination fee might deter a 
subsequent bid is not necessarily sufficient to justify a finding that a 
termination fee is preclusive.  For example, courts have expressed their 
willingness to restrict the use of excessive fees when parties push the 
envelope, but not if the result is simply to encourage marginal bidding.135  A 
policy of not seeking to squeeze every last drop of surplus from a transaction 
is consistent with Delaware's general deference to board discretion and 
decision making.136  However, this deference is not without limits;137 to the 
extent a deal protection measure deters materially higher bids or results in 
shifting transaction surplus away from selling shareholders, in a material 
way, a court should find such measures unreasonable. 
B.  The Emerging Standard for Matching Rights 
In recent years, plaintiffs' counsel have increasingly challenged the use 
of matching rights in merger agreements arguing that matching rights are 
preclusive and therefore, unreasonable in the context of a sale of control.138  
While courts have accepted the argument that excessive compensatory 
devices—like termination fees and stock lockups—have the potential to be 
preclusive,139 they have not yet accepted the argument that matching rights 
may have a similarly preclusive effect, alone or in combination with other 
deal protection measures.  Indeed, courts' opinions do not appear to 
 
                                                                                                             
135The Toys "R" Us court explained: 
The central purpose of Revlon is to ensure the fidelity of fiduciaries.  It is not a 
license for the judiciary to set arbitrary limits on the contract terms that fiduciaries 
acting loyally and carefully can shape in the pursuit of their stockholders' interest.  
Even less is it the purpose of Revlon to push the pricing of sales transactions to the 
outer margins (or beyond) of their social utility.  If second bidders fear that any 
move beyond a small topping bid might leave them making an imprudent bid for a 
public company, it is not clear why our society benefits by encouraging bids of that 
type or how it would be harmed by their preclusion. 
In re Toys "R" Us, Inc. S'holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1021 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
136See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954. 
137Id. (discussing that a board's power could be abused and therefore enhanced scrutiny is 
required in some settings). 
138See, e.g.,  Compl. at 26, Greater Pa. Carpenters' Pension Fund v. Bergen, C.A. No. 6220 
(Del. Ch. Feb. 25, 2011) (alleging that directors breached their fiduciary duties to the corporation by 
granting a matching right in a merger agreement that was preclusive); see also Compl. at 11, 
Varipapa v. Warner Music Grp. Corp., C.A. No. 6478 (Del. Ch. May 12, 2011) (alleging that 
directors breached their fiduciary duties to the corporation by granting a matching right in a merger 
agreement that was preclusive). 
139See, e.g., In re Cogent, Inc. S'holder Litig., 7 A.3d 487, 501 (Del. Ch. 2010) (noting that 
a court must review deal protection measures "to ensure that they are reasonable and do not preclude 
a higher bid from being successful"). 
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recognize the prospect that matching rights might have any potentially 
preclusive effects.140  Notwithstanding regular challenges to the use of 
matching rights in merger agreements, courts rarely grant matching rights the 
same degree of respect they accord to compensatory schemes and other 
exclusivity measures like no-shop provisions. 
For example, in Toys "R" Us, the Delaware Court of Chancery heard 
expert testimony on the potentially preclusive effects of matching rights in 
merger agreements.141  Relying on expert reports from Profs. Preston McAfee 
and Guhan Subramanian, the plaintiffs argued that explicit matching rights 
combined with a termination fee had the capability of deterring subsequent 
bids and therefore a board granting such protections might be acting in a 
manner inconsistent with its obligations under Revlon.142  In particular, 
Subramanian argued, in accord with the economic literature, that one should 
expect matching rights to prove a more or less formidable deal protection 
measure depending on the characteristics exhibited by the sale process.143  He 
noted that where there are matching rights in place one would expect 
financial buyers to be less likely to provide a topping bid or otherwise 
engage in an active auction process.144  Data provided to the court by 
Subramanian supports that statement.145  To the extent topping bids appeared 
in merger transactions with matching rights in place, the vast majority were 
bids offered by strategic bidders and not financial buyers.146  These results 
were again consistent with the understanding in the literature that matching 
rights will be less likely to deter bidders with materially higher private 
valuations in the context of a sale that exhibits private value characteristics. 
Notwithstanding the evidence presented in Toys "R" Us, the court was 
dismissive of the potentially preclusive power of matching rights in general.  
The court noted that matching rights and termination fees are a "common 
contractual feature" and not "per se invalid."147  The court also held that the 
combination of a matching right and a termination fee did not present an 
unreasonable challenge to a second bidder who might wish to pay a 
 
                                                                                                             
140See Toys "R" Us, 877 A.2d at 1017 (noting that matching rights are "common contractual 
feature[s]"). 
141Id. at 1014. 
142Id.; see also Aff. of R. Preston McAfee at 7-8, In re Toys "R" Us, Inc. S'holder Litig., 
877 A.2d 975 (Del. Ch. 2005) (C.A. No. 1212-N); Aff. of Guhan Subramanian at 13-17, In re Toys 
"R" Us, Inc. S'holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975 (Del. Ch. 2005) (C.A. No. 1212-N). 
143Aff. of Guhan Subramanian, supra note 142, at 7-8. 
144Id. 
145Id. at 9. 
146Id. at 6-7. 
147Toys "R" Us, 877 A.2d at 1017.   
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materially higher price.148  Indeed, the Toys "R" Us court noted examples of 
real world deal situations in which the presence of a matching right was 
insufficient to deter a second bidder from paying a materially higher price.149 
The examples cited by the court all involved auction contests between 
strategic bidders in transactions that exhibited private value characteristics.150 
The court pointedly did not cite examples of financial bidders generating 
topping bids in the presence of matching rights, which was the precise 
situation in Toys "R" Us.  In short, when dismissing the plaintiffs' claims that 
matching rights may have deterrent effects against potential financial bidders 
as second bidders, the court restated part of the plaintiff's argument:  
strategic bidders with private valuations are less likely to be deterred from 
making a topping bid than financial bidders with common valuations when 
matching rights are present.151  Ironically, in dismissing the plaintiffs' case 
the court relied on the substance of the plaintiff experts' arguments while 
ignoring their most obvious conclusions—matching rights in a sale of 
corporate control demonstrating common value characteristics may have 
preclusive effects that should cause courts to pause. 
Since Toys "R" Us, courts have repeatedly been asked to rule on limits 
to the deployment of matching rights in defense of a merger transaction.152  
Although courts have not abandoned the intermediate standard of review 
with respect to its application to matching rights, they do not consistently 
consider the potentially preclusive effect of those rights.153  This may be 
because, unlike termination fees where the deterrent effect can be a function 
of its size, matching rights do not share the same linear-like function with 
respect to their potential preclusive effect.  Because the potential preclusive 
effect of termination fees can be calculated as a function of their size,154 
courts may feel more comfortable asserting that large termination fees are 
 
                                                                                                             
148Id. at 1018. 
149Id. at 1019 ("[T]here are actual examples that prove that a package of this kind would not 
deter a fervent bidder intent on paying a materially higher price for the Company."). 
150The court cited the example of Qwest and Verizon battling for control of MCI as an 
example of how matching rights are weak deal protection devices.  Id. The court also cited the active 
contest for control of Warner-Lambert by American Home Products and Pfizer (two strategic 
bidders). Toys "R" Us, 877 A.2d at 1019 n.75.  
151Id. at 1021-22. 
152See In re Cogent, Inc. S'holder Litig., 7 A.3d 487, 501-02 (Del. Ch. 2010); In re Dollar 
Thrifty S'holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 575 (Del. Ch. 2010); In re Lear Corp. S'holder Litig., 926 A.2d 
94, 119 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
153See, e.g., Toys "R" Us, 877 A.2d at 1017 (noting that matching rights are "common 
contractual feature[s]"). 
154See La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Crawford, 918 A.2d 1172, 1181 n.10 (Del. Ch. 
2007) (noting that a court must consider a number of factors in determining if a deal protection is 
preclusive including "the overall size of the termination fee"). 
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unreasonable.  Matching rights, on the other hand, must be assessed with a 
different contextual framework.155  Consequently, without an appropriate 
contextual framework for assessing the potential preclusive nature of 
matching rights courts rely on a short-hand approach to matching rights that 
ignores their deterrent effect and defers to board decisions to grant them.156  
For example, in Cogent Shareholders Litigation, the plaintiffs argued 
that the language of the no-solicitation provision of Cogent's merger 
agreement with 3M—which included a combination of a no-shop provision 
with a fiduciary out, information rights, plus an explicit matching right—was 
preclusive.157  The matching rights in the agreement required the seller to 
negotiate in good faith with the acquirer for five days in the event the seller 
received a superior offer.158  The court responded by ruling that "[a]fter 
reviewing the arguments and relevant case law . . . [the] Plaintiffs are not 
likely to succeed in showing that the no-shop and matching rights provisions 
are unreasonable either separately or in combination."159  The court reasoned 
that the combination of the no-shop and the matching rights were reasonable 
provisions to provide the initial bidder with some assurance that he would 
have an "adequate opportunity to buy the seller, even if a higher bid later 
emerges."160  While the court focused on the fact that the no-shop provision 
included a fiduciary termination right that did not preclude the seller from 
engaging in discussions with a second bidder with a higher offer, the court 
did not provide any contextualized analysis of the matching right or 
reasoning for why it believed a matching right in this circumstance was not 
preclusive.161  The court might have observed that in the particular case of 
Cogent, where the acquirer was a strategic buyer, matching rights do not 
present as much of a concern with respect to the seller's fiduciary 
obligations, but it did not.  Rather, the court rested its determination of 
reasonableness on the notion that the matching right provides initial bidders 
some level of assurance that their transaction-specific investments will not be 
lost in the event the initial bid is topped by a second bidder and thereby 
encourage initial bids.162 
 
                                                                                                             
155See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text. 
156Cogent, 7 A.3d at 502. 
157Id. at 501-02; see also Cogent, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) [hereinafter Cogent 
Agreement], at Exhibit 2.1, Section 6.8 (Aug. 31, 2010). 
158Cogent, 7 A.3d at 501-02. 
159Id. at 502. 
160Id.  The court does not indicate why a reasonably priced termination fee is not sufficient 
to assuage an initial bidder of the fear that it might lose its transaction-specific investments due to a 
successful second bidder. 
161Id. 
162Cogent, 7 A.3d at 502. 
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In 3Com Shareholders Litigation, the plaintiffs challenged 3Com's 
sale to Hewlett Packard; here, the court was equally dismissive of the 
plaintiffs' matching rights claim.163  Plaintiffs alleged, among other things, 
that a four percent termination fee, combined with a no-solicitation provision 
and matching rights "effectively preclude any other bidders who might be 
interested in paying more than HP for the Company . . . ."164  Without 
engaging in a searching analysis, the Chancery Court ruled that the matching 
rights were not preclusive and reiterated that the Chancery Court "has 
repeatedly held that . . . [matching rights] are standard merger terms, are not 
per se unreasonable, and do not alone constitute breaches of fiduciary 
duty."165  It is of course true that such deal protection measures are not per se 
unreasonable.  However, the court in 3Com declined to engage in any of the 
contextualized analysis required to determine what effect—if any—matching 
rights might be expected to have in this circumstance.166 
Similarly, in Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. Shareholder Litigation, 
the Delaware Court of Chancery found that the deal protection measures, 
including a termination fee and matching rights, were "relatively standard in 
form and have not been shown to be preclusive or coercive, whether they are 
considered separately or collectively."167  Courts have begun to adopt this 
"standard merger terms" language in a manner that suggests courts have 
accepted these defensive measures as per se valid.168  While this may not, in 
fact, be the case, what is lacking is a contextualized approach to the 
application of matching rights in merger agreements anywhere near the 
analysis offered by the court in Toys "R" Us.169  Such an analysis would 
 
                                                                                                             
163In re 3Com S'holders Litig., 2009 WL 5173804, at *7 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2009) ("The 
[matching right] provisions that plaintiffs attack have been repeatedly upheld by this Court."). 
164Pls.' Mot. for Expedited Proceedings at 8, In re 3Com S'holders Litig., 2009 WL 5173804 
(Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 2009) (C.A. No. 5067-CC). 
1653Com, 2009 WL 5173804, at *7.  
166Id. 
167In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. S'holder Litig., 2011 WL 2028076, at *21 (Del. Ch. 
May 20, 2011). 
168See, e.g., In re Atheros Commc'ns, Inc., 2011 WL 864928, at *7 n.61 (Del. Ch. 
Mar. 4, 2011). 
169The Toys "R" Us court explained the appropriate analysis for deal protections: 
[A] reasonableness inquiry does not presume that all business circumstances are 
identical or that there is any naturally occurring rate of deal protection . . .  Instead, 
that inquiry examines whether the board granting the deal protections had a 
reasonable basis to accede to the other side's demand for them in negotiations.  In 
that inquiry, the court must attempt, as far as possible, to view the question from 
the perspective of the directors themselves, taking into account the real world risks 
and prospects confronting them when they agreed to the deal protections. 
In re Toys "R" Us, Inc. S'holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1016 (Del. Ch. 2005) (citations omitted). 
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make it clear to transactional lawyers that matching rights, like other deal 
protection measures, are subject to intermediate scrutiny and not 
presumptively valid. 170 
V.   A CONTEXTUALIZED APPROACH TO MATCHING RIGHTS 
Since lawyers tend to read too much into court decisions—or lack 
thereof—there is a threat that the courts' permissive approach with respect to 
matching rights may be misinterpreted.171  Transactional lawyers and 
litigators may misinterpret the courts' previous leniency with respect to the 
granting of matching rights for the adoption of a bright-line rule favoring the 
use of potentially preclusive matching rights in merger agreements.  This 
tendency for transactional lawyers to sometimes oversimplify the courts' 
reasoning cautions courts to treat challenges to director decisions to grant 
initial bidders matching rights with the same seriousness and subtlety that 
they treat other deal protection claims.   
Courts should apply the same highly-contextualized facts and 
circumstances analysis that is used when reviewing board decisions to adopt 
other deal protection measures.172  Courts should also avoid the temptation of 
adopting a per se reasonableness approach to matching rights.  There may 
well be circumstances where a matching right is preclusive, and courts 
should be prepared to strike down rights in such circumstances.173  Of course, 
a reasonableness test for matching rights will, by necessity, be different in 
important respects than the contoured analysis offered by the court in 
Crawford.174  A contextualized analysis of matching rights should focus on 
the currency of such rights, which include: (1) the nature of the initial 
bidder, (2) access to information, and (3) time.  What follows are a series of 
considerations that courts should take into account when evaluating whether 
matching right provisions are more or less preclusive, or otherwise work to 
the detriment of selling shareholders.  
 
                                                                                                             
170See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985). 
171Professors Coates and Subramanian argue that transactional lawyers tend to read too 
much into Delaware decisions regarding deal protections.  They are, perhaps, looking for bright-line 
rules to help guide practice.  See Coates & Subramanian, supra note 37, at 336-37.  
172See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
173See, e.g., Aff. of R. Preston McAfee, supra note 142, at 8. 
174La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Crawford, 918 A.2d 1172, 1181 n.10 (Del. Ch. 
2007). 
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A.  The Nature of the Initial Bidder 
The first component of a contextualized analysis of matching rights 
relates to the profile of the right-holder and whether the transaction exhibits 
attributes of a common value or private value sale.  The economic incentives 
in the transaction differ with respect to the nature of the initial bidder.  In 
current business practice, private equity bidders engaged in leveraged 
transactions most closely resemble common value bidders.175  Transactions 
with matching rights that exhibit attributes of common value auctions may 
be more troublesome for courts for at least two reasons: (1) second bidders 
are less likely to attempt a topping bid in the common value setting when the 
initial bidder is holding a matching right; and (2) where a common value 
bidder holds a preemptive matching right, the initial bidders may be able to 
extract surplus out of the transaction by offering less than its full valuation 
for the seller because the threat of a topping bid is minimal.   
Private equity and financial bidders are notoriously shy about 
engaging in bidding contests or generating topping bids.176  This is consistent 
with our understanding of common value bidders.  Leveraged acquisitions 
depend on the targets' ability to generate sufficient cash from cash flow to 
repay debt taken to finance the acquisition; therefore, such transactions are 
limited in their returns by the amount of leverage they can take on and the 
cost of capital.177  Financial buyers are not normally able to generate private 
value from an acquisition through combination with other existing 
activities.178  Leverage ratios and the cost of capital are common variables 
amongst almost all the players in the industries.179  Private equity bidders 
bring few synergies to the bidding table.180  Consequently, the challenge for 
the private equity bidder is not to overpay or fall victim to the winner's curse 
when completing an acquisition.181 
 
                                                                                                             
175Quinn, supra note 1, at 871. 
176For example, Berkshire Hathaway—a financial buyer—has published its acquisition 
criteria in its annual report which includes among other conditions: a requirement that management 
remain in place for any sale and that Berkshire Hathaway not participate in any auctions. 
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 28 (2011), available at 
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/2010ar/2010ar.pdf. 
177JOSHUA LERNER, FELDA HARDYMON & ANN LEAMON, VENTURE CAPITAL AND 
PRIVATE EQUITY: A CASEBOOK 1 (4th ed. 2009). 
178See id. 
179See, e.g., Peter Cramton & Alan Schwartz, Using Auction Theory to Inform Takeover 
Regulation, 7 J. L. Econ. & Org. 27, 47 (1991). 
180See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text. 
181Milgrom, supra note 94, at 5. 
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The common value bidder with a matching right knows two things.  
First, there is an objective upper limit to what they are willing to bid.  
Second, they will have the right to revisit their bid and match second comers 
up until that limit.  Consequently, initial bidders holding a matching right in 
the common value setting have an incentive to bid less than the full 
valuation.  When a second bid does not appear, the initial common value 
bidder is able to extract surplus from the transaction.  Potential second 
bidders in a common value setting are, or should be, uninfluenced by initial 
low-ball bids.  These bidders understand the only way they will be 
successful in acquiring the target will be if their assessment of the objective 
value of the seller is incorrect.  This is the winner's curse.182 
While the transaction with the initial bidder still creates joint value for 
both buyer and seller through the presence of the matching rights, the 
acquirer has the ability to affect distribution of transaction gains in favor of 
the buyer.  Although a structural bias against generating higher bids for 
selling shareholders is not necessarily preclusive, it seems inconsistent with 
the charge to directors of a seller to take actions reasonably intended to 
maximize the value for selling shareholders.183  Indeed, if theory predicts that 
matching rights should deter second bids and distribute transactional gains in 
favor of buyers, a court could reasonably determine that granting matching 
rights to bidders who demonstrate common value characteristics is 
unreasonable in certain circumstances.  This could be true even if the board 
mistakenly believes such rights are "boilerplate" and grants them in good 
faith.  
Sales of control that exhibit characteristics of private value auctions 
are of less concern from the point of view of the reasonableness of the deal 
protections.  Strategic bidders typically have private valuations for the 
seller.184  While valuation differences in common value auctions arise due to 
differences in information, valuation differences in the private value context 
are traced to complementary business units controlled by the bidder that 
might generate synergies.185  Thus, each bidder's valuation of the seller is 
independent of any other potential bidder's valuation.  Consequently, 
strategic bidders are not generally deterred by the presence of a matching 
right.186  The optimal strategy for a strategic buyer is to bid up to, but not 
 
                                                                                                             
182Id. 
183See, e.g., Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC  Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del. 1994) 
("[D]irectors must decide which alternative is most likely to offer the best value reasonably available 
to the stockholders."). 
184See Quinn, supra note 1, at 871. 
185See supra Part III.B. 
186Quinn, supra note 1, at 870-71. 
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beyond, its private valuation of the target without regard to what other 
bidders do. As a result, matching rights in a corporate sale that exhibit 
private value characteristics are not likely to be preclusive.187   
The circumstances in which one might expect a strategic bidder to be 
deterred from making a topping bid are those in which the potential second 
bidder's valuation is close to the current bid price.188  In the presence of a 
matching right, a second bidder can only reasonably expect to win when 
their bid is substantially higher than all other bidders and is substantially 
higher than the right-holder's private valuation.189  Thus, a matching right can 
play a role in deterring or ending incremental bidding amongst strategic 
bidders, while not necessarily precluding a subsequent bid from a bidder 
with a significantly higher private valuation for the seller.190   
Bidders' varied responses to matching rights are related to the profile 
of bidders and the nature of the sale process. This suggests a contextualized 
approach to evaluating the reasonableness of such terms.  In that regard, 
courts should be more willing to closely scrutinize matching rights granted in 
connection with transactions that demonstrate common value characteristics 
(e.g. where the initial bidder is a financial buyer).   
 
                                                                                                             
187It is sometimes noted that in recent years financial buyers have consistently paid more for 
targets than strategic buyers.  While that may be true, these recent valuations by financial bidders are 
a function of the relatively low cost of capital.  "The result is that during periods of robust credit 
markets, such as occurred during 2004 to 2007, the highest bidders in takeover contests may often 
be those bidders, such as private equity firms, who are capable of using large amounts of debt 
financing."  Robert P. Bartlett III, Taking Finance Seriously: How Debt Financing Distorts Bidding 
Outcomes in Corporate Takeovers, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1975, 1975 (2008).  This imbalance 
cannot be expected to last forever.  The key point here is that, although prior to the financial crisis 
financial bidders were able to outbid strategic buyers, the strength of financial buyers relative to 
strategic buyers in recent years was a function of the credit bubble and thus not generally 
representative.  
188In auction literature, the presence of a matching right in a bidding contest with strategic 
buyers approximates a third price auction.  Bikhchandani et al., supra note 58, at 9.  In a second 
price, or Vickery, auction, the bidder with the highest valuation wins the auction, but pays the 
second highest revealed value.  In a third price auction, the presence of a matching right converts a 
second price auction into a third price auction for the right-holder.  The winning right-holder then 
pays the second highest among the others' bids.  The right-holder may win even if her valuation is 
less than the second highest valuation of the other bidders. Bikhchandani et al., supra note 58, at 9; 
see also John H. Kagel & Dan Levin, Independent Private Value Auctions: Bidder Behaviour in 
First-, Second- and Third-Price Auctions with Varying Numbers of Bidders, 103 ECON. J. 868, 868-
69 (1993). 
189Bikhchandani et al., supra note 58, at 9. 
190Id. at 10.  Incremental bidding presents a challenge.  Although incremental bidding can 
generate additional value for sellers, courts have adopted a policy of not encouraging this approach 
to bidding.  While one might debate the value of deploying matching rights to avoid incremental 
bidding, such rights do not preclude a private value bidder, with a significantly higher private 
valuation, from topping an initial bid. 
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B.  Information 
Information is another key aspect of the deterrent power of matching 
rights.  Information and information rights are particularly important in 
situations where the amount and type of information the potential bidder 
receives affects the valuation of the target.191  Information plays an important 
role in sales processes, particularly those with common value characteristics 
where the extent to which initial bidders receive superior information, 
relative to subsequent bidders, will affect the incentives subsequent bidders 
have to make transaction-specific investments in putting together a 
competing bid.  Specifically, information plays a key role in assuring parties 
do not overpay in the common value setting.192   
In that regard, initial bidders have strict informational advantages over 
potential topping bidders.193  With superior information, initial bidders are 
better able to generate an accurate estimate of the objective value of the 
target.  With better estimates, initial bidders are in a better position to know 
when they are in danger of overpaying.194  Compare that with potential 
second bidders who must generate an estimate with less information and in 
relatively rapid fashion.  Successful second bidders are more likely to 
overbid and thus suffer from the winner's curse.195  Consequently, for the 
second bidder in the common value setting, there are few incentives to 
engage in a bidding contest with an initial bidder with a matching right.  
Indeed, risk-averse private value bidders may find the prospect of sharing 
confidential information, which might relate to the second bidder's business 
with the seller and the right-holder, a deterrent from bidding at all.  Where 
the proper measure of preclusion is the likelihood of a deal protection 
measure deterring a subsequent bid from appearing, a matching right may be 
preclusive.196  
In situations where management is involved directly or indirectly with 
private equity bidders, the information advantage in favor of the initial 
bidder is exacerbated.  The special access to information afforded to 
common value bidders, when they cooperate with incumbent management, 
improves the ability of the bidder to generate an accurate estimate of the 
seller's value.197  More information for the initial bidder means that they will 
 
                                                                                                             
 191See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text. 
192See Quinn, supra note 1, at 871. 
193Id. 
194Id. 
195See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
196See In re Dollar Thrifty S'holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 613 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
197See Dale Arthur Oesterle & Jon R. Norberg, Management Buyouts: Creating or 
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be less likely to overpay for the seller.  If management is involved with a 
private equity bidder, one of the few circumstances in which a second bidder 
can expect to win a bidding contest is when the second bidder overpays.198  
Thus, the granting of a matching right to an initial bidder participating with 
management may also deter second bids from appearing and thus be 
preclusive.  
C.  Timing 
In addition to the nature of the right-holder and information, the extent 
to which the design and structure of matching rights included in the merger 
agreement creates a cushion of time for the right-holder may also influence 
the determination whether the rights are preclusive.  Where matching rights 
create lengthy delays before a seller might accept or even consider a 
subsequent bid, such rights may be preclusive.  For example, a seller might 
grant an initial bidder a series of advance notice provisions, including the 
following: a five day delay prior to consideration of a subsequent offer, a 
five day delay prior to changing a board recommendation, and a five day 
requirement to negotiate in good faith prior to accepting an alternative offer. 
 The general effect of the combined advance notice provisions might be to 
unreasonably delay consideration of an alternative offer.  A subsequent 
bidder, facing the prospect of lengthy delays imposed by the right-holder 
may be deterred from submitting a bid and therefore be preclusive.  On the 
other hand, shorter advance notice provisions may provide a more modest 
deterrent to a subsequent bidder and therefore be reasonable.  Because the 
timing involved in considering and accepting a subsequent offer is so critical 
to a topping bidder's decision to submit a bid, courts should consider the 
potential deterrent effect, if any, of delays posed by advance notice 
provisions as unreasonable. 
D.  Other Considerations 
There are a number of other circumstances that courts should take into 
consideration when evaluating the reasonableness of granting matching 
rights; for example, whether matching rights are granted to an initial bidder 
before the seller has had an opportunity to shop the transaction.199  
                                                                                                             
Appropriating Shareholder Wealth?, 41 VAND. L. REV. 207, 217-18 (1988) (discussing that 
management has access to inside information which affects their valuation for a company). 
198See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text. 
199This is consistent with the reasoning with respect to the granting of termination fees or 
stock lockups to initial bidders. See, e.g., Kahan & Klausner, supra note 38, at 1563-64 (discussing 
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Alternatively, matching rights may be granted at the tail end of a played out 
auction.  With respect to the question of whether such rights might be 
preclusive, matching rights that are granted at the end of a played out auction 
are less troublesome than matching rights that are granted to an initial 
bidder.  The former may represent an attempt by a board to reasonably 
provide some certainty and resolution to a process that has generated 
significant valuation information about the seller.  On the other hand, 
granting matching rights to an initial bidder may raise concerns depending 
on the profile of the acquirer.   
Courts should also take into consideration the potentially preclusive 
effect of matching rights combined with other deal protection measures.  
Combinations may result in a transaction being over-protected.200  For 
example, a properly calculated termination fee should be sufficient to cover 
the opportunity costs of an acquirer in putting together a bid.  With a 
properly calculated termination fee, an initial bidder should be indifferent to 
a topping bid.  Having already been compensated for the costs of putting 
together a bid, the matching rights provide additional assurances in excess of 
what might be required to generate an initial bid.  Matching rights in the 
private value setting, as noted above, have the effect of deterring marginal 
bids.201  When a private value bidder with a materially larger valuation for 
the seller is less likely to place a subsequent bid due to the combination of a 
termination fee and matching rights, the combination may be preclusive.  In 
any event, recent court opinions rationalizing the use of matching rights to 
provide initial bidders with sufficient deal certainty or to justify their 
transaction-specific investments are ignoring the compensatory effect of 
termination fees.202  A reasonably priced termination fee should be large 
enough to compensate an initial bidder for the transaction-specific 
investments involved in generating an initial bid.  Encouraging initial bids 
through both a termination fee as well as additional certainty may prove too 
much.  
Other combinations of deal protections are less likely to be preclusive 
and therefore may be reasonable.  For example, when a seller grants a non-
solicitation provision with a fiduciary termination right as well as a matching 
                                                                                                             
the impacts of granting lock-ups to initial bidders).   
200See, e.g., In re Cogent, Inc. S'holder Litig., 7 A.3d 487, 508-09 (Del. Ch. 2010) (after 
reviewing each deal protection measure independently, the court reviewed the "cumulative effect" to 
determine if, when combined, the protection measures were preclusive). 
201See supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text. 
202See, e.g., Cogent, 7 A.3d at 502 ("[I]n an effort to entice an acquirer to make a strong 
offer, it is reasonable for a seller to provide a buyer some level of assurance that he will be given 
adequate opportunity to buy the seller, even if a higher bid later emerges."). 
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right, that combination will not likely present any more of a deterrent to a 
subsequent private value bidder than a matching right on its own.  
E.  Examples of a Contextualized Approach 
What follows are two examples of how a court might apply this 
contextualized analysis to the question of whether matching rights are 
reasonable.  The first example involves H.P.'s recent acquisition of 3Par after 
a bidding contest with Dell.203  In that transaction, Dell signed a merger 
agreement with 3Par that included information rights, three day advance 
notice provisions, as well as a good faith negotiation provision and a 
termination fee.204  Although these protections appear substantial, they were 
not preclusive.  This transaction exhibited attributes of a private value sale.  
Dell is a strategic buyer that sought out 3Par for the synergies associated 
with the company.205  Dell's private value for 3Par was known only to Dell 
and was independent of the valuation of any other potential bidder.  One 
expects that in the private value setting, matching rights should not prove an 
insurmountable barrier to a bidder with a higher private value for the seller.   
As it turned out, there was at least one other potential bidder: H.P.206  
Like Dell, H.P. was a private value bidder.  Its own valuation of 3Par was 
independent of Dell's valuation of 3Par.  Not long after the transaction was 
announced, H.P. made a topping bid for 3Par.207  After a number of rounds, 
Dell, the initial bidder, dropped out in favor of H.P.208  In that setting, the 
presence of a combination of deal protections, including significant 
matching rights, was not preclusive.  The seller ended up in the hands of the 
private value acquirer with a private valuation that was materially higher 
than the initial bid for 3Par.209 
 
                                                                                                             
2033Par Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) [hereinafter 3Par Agreement], at Exhibit 2.1 
(Aug. 16, 2010). 
204Id. at Exhibit 2.1, Article 10. 
205James Rogers, Dell's 3Par Buy is a Shrewd Move, THE STREET 
(Aug. 16, 2010, 9:13 AM), http://www.thestreet.com/story/10836514/1/dells-3Par-buy-is-a-shrewd-
move.html. 
206DEALBOOK, H.P. Wins 3Par as Bidding War Ends, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK 




209H.P.'s winning bid for 3Par was eighty-three percent higher than Dell's original bid.  For 
contemporaneous descriptions of the 3Par bidding contest for 3Par, see DEALBOOK, supra note 206; 
Steven M. Davidoff, Dell and Its Deadline, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Sept. 1, 2010, 8:25 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/09/01/dell-and-its-deadline/. 
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In the example above, the presence of a matching right clearly did not 
preclude a subsequent determined bidder from beginning an auction contest 
for the seller.  That result is not totally unexpected.  The 3Par sale involved 
strategic bidders, each with their own private valuation of the seller.  
Economic theory suggests that in such situations matching rights will not 
necessarily deter second bidders who are risk-averse and have materially 
higher valuations.  A court reviewing a challenge to matching rights in the 
initial merger agreement with Dell would be correct to hold that matching 
rights in that circumstance were not preclusive.  However, it does not require 
20/20 hindsight to reach this conclusion.  The private value characteristics of 
the sale suggest that a matching right would not necessarily deter a higher 
valuing strategic bidder.  A court could conclude that, with respect to the 
matching rights available in the 3Par transaction, they were reasonable when 
granted to the right-holder. 
A second example of a seller granting a matching right—but this time 
in a manner that might raise concerns of unreasonableness—is the case of J. 
Crew Group's transaction with private equity investor TPG to take the 
company private for $43.50 per share in cash.210  This transaction was 
controversial because of a variety of procedural shortcomings.211  One of 
those included the fact that the CEO of J. Crew Group expressed a 
preference to do this sale of control transaction with only the initial bidder.212 
 Managers, including the CEO, participated in the ownership group of the 
post-transaction corporation.213  The transaction included a number of deal 
protections, including a termination fee and matching rights; these rights 
included information rights, advance notice provisions, and a good faith 
negotiation right.214  The seller also received a go-shop provision as part of 
the transaction.215 
 
                                                                                                             
210J.Crew Grp. Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Mar. 1, 2011); see also Michael J. de la 
Merced, J. Crew Shareholders Approve $3 Billion Buyout, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK 
(Mar. 1, 2011, 10:15 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/03/01/j-crew-shareholders-approve-
buyout/ (providing detail of the $43.50 per share offer). 
211Steven M. Davidoff, J. Crew Buyout Raises Questions, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK 
(Dec. 10, 2010, 4:14 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/12/10/j-crew-buyout-raises-questions/ 
(discussing the various flaws that occurred in the buyout process). 
212Id. 
213J.Crew Grp. Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) [hereinafter the J.Crew Agreement], at 
Exhibit 2.1, Section 1.6 (Nov. 26, 2010). 
214J.Crew Group granted the following matching rights to the acquiring group: 
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary set forth in this Agreement, prior to the 
time the Company Stockholder Approval is obtained, but not after, the Board of 
Directors of the Company may make a Company Adverse Recommendation  . . . 
provided, however, that (1) the Company has given Parent at least three calendar 
days' prior written notice of its intention to take such action (which notice shall 
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Given the profile of the transaction, which included an acquirer with 
common value attributes and the participation of management with the initial 
bidder, two things are expected.  First, one would not expect a subsequent 
common value bidder to make a topping bid.  Second, to the extent there was 
transaction surplus to be divided between the acquirer and the shareholders 
of the seller, the acquirer should capture most of that surplus.  No matter 
how good the sellers are as negotiators one should not expect them to be able 
to capture a significant amount of transaction surplus without the 
competitive threat of a viable third party bid.216  In this circumstance, a court 
could examine the use of matching rights and determine that the structural, 
informational, and time advantages such rights afforded the initial bidder 
effectively precluded second bidders from making competitive bids.  In fact, 
the go-shop provision generated no additional competitive offers to compete 
with the offer of the financial buyer cooperating with the management 
group.217 
                                                                                                             
include an unredacted copy of the Superior Proposal, an unredacted copy of the 
relevant proposed transaction agreements and a copy of any financing 
commitments (including Redacted Fee Letters) relating thereto and a written 
summary of the material terms of any Superior Proposal not made in writing, 
including any financing commitments relating thereto), (2) the Company has 
negotiated, and has caused its Representatives to negotiate, in good faith with 
Parent during such notice period, to the extent Parent wishes to negotiate, to enable 
Parent to propose revisions to the terms of this Agreement, the Financing Letters 
and the Guaranty such that it would cause such Superior Proposal to no longer 
constitute a Superior Proposal, (3) following the end of such notice period, the 
Board of Directors of the Company (acting upon recommendation of the Special 
Committee) shall have considered in good faith any proposed revisions to this 
Agreement, the Financing Letters, the Rollover Letter and the Guaranty proposed 
in writing by Parent in a manner that would form a binding contract if accepted by 
the Company, and shall have determined that the Superior Proposal would continue 
to constitute a Superior Proposal if such revisions were to be given effect and (4) in 
the event of any material change to the material terms of such Superior Proposal, 
the Company shall, in each case, have delivered to Parent an additional notice 
consistent with that described in clause (1) above and the notice period shall have 
recommenced, except that the notice period shall be at least one calendar day 
(rather than the three calendar days otherwise contemplated by clause (1) above); 
and provided, further that the Company has complied in all material respects with 
its obligations under this Section 5.2 and provided, further, that any purported 
termination of this Agreement pursuant to this sentence shall be void and of no 
force and effect, unless the Company termination is in accordance with Section 7.1 
and, to the extent required under the terms of this Agreement, the Company pays 
Parent the applicable Termination Fee in accordance with Section 7.3 prior to or 
concurrently with such termination. 
Id. at Exhibit 2.1, Section 5.2(e).  
215Id. at Exhibit 2.1, Section 5.2(a). 
216See Bulow & Klemperer, supra note 60, at 1568. 
217Michael J. de la Merced, J. Crew 'Go-Shop' Ends with No New Bids, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK (Jan. 17, 2011, 11:49 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/01/17/j-crew-fetches-no-
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Of course, the object of these two examples is not to engage in ex post 
evaluations in which hindsight is 20/20.  Instead, these examples 
demonstrate that the bidder profile, as well as the informational and timing 
advantages engendered by various matching rights, can affect subsequent 
bidders' incentives to generate competing bids and the distribution of 
transaction surplus, making these measures unreasonable.  
Although findings of unreasonableness typically involve some 
"evidence of self-interest, undue favoritism or disdain towards a particular 
bidder, or a similar non-stockholder-motivated influence that calls into 
question the integrity of the process," it is nevertheless possible for a board, 
acting in good faith, to make unreasonable decisions.218  Where a board, in 
good faith, grants an initial bidder with common value attributes matching 
rights and other deal protections, such decisions may be unreasonable and 
therefore require the attention of the courts.  It is possible that a board, 
relying on recent case law,219 may mistakenly determine in good faith that 
matching rights are no more than standard terms and grants such rights to a 
buyer in circumstances that are preclusive of subsequent bids or have 
negative distributional effects.  Rather than permit that to happen, courts 
should signal that they remain open to the possibility that there are 
potentially preclusive uses of matching rights, instead of simply accepting 
such rights as standard terms or mere boilerplate.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Professors Coates and Subramanian have argued that "courts should 
not rubber-stamp" deal protections.220  And, in most cases courts do not.  In 
the special case of matching rights, in recent years courts have refused to 
accept plaintiffs' arguments that in some circumstances matching rights may 
"overprotect" a deal by providing more compensation than is necessary to 
induce an initial bid.  Notwithstanding pronouncements by the courts that 
such rights are no more than standard or common deal terms, they can create 
economically powerful structural incentives against subsequent bidders.  
Because the presence of matching rights may have the power to deter 
subsequent bids, there are circumstances when granting such rights to initial 
bidders may be unreasonable.  In those cases, courts should not be afraid to 
                                                                                                             
new-takeover-bids/. 
218In re Del Monte Foods Co. S'holders Litig., 2011 WL 532014, at *15 (Del. Ch. 
Feb. 14, 2011) (noting boards can act in good faith, but nevertheless make inequitable decisions). 
219See, e.g., In re 3Com S'holders Litig., 2009 WL 5173804, at *6 (Del. Ch. 
Dec. 18, 2009). 
220Coates & Subramanian, supra note 37, at 389-90. 
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find that the use of matching rights is either preclusive, or lies outside the 
range of reasonable responses to the perceived threat. 
Of course, this is not to say, as the courts correctly acknowledge, that 
there are no circumstances under which a board acting reasonably in 
conformity with its fiduciary obligations might agree to grant matching 
rights to an initial bidder.  Indeed, there are circumstances in which such an 
action would be perfectly reasonable and entirely consistent with their 
fiduciary obligations.  For instance, when a fully-informed board, acting in 
good faith, negotiates a sale to an unaffiliated third party, decisions to grant 
the initial bidder matching rights may well be reasonable.   
However, economic theory suggests that courts should employ a more 
nuanced and serious approach to reviewing the use of matching rights.  At 
the very least, courts should subject matching rights to the same level of 
scrutiny as that applied to termination fees.  There are circumstances—for 
example, in transactions with controlling shareholders—where courts should 
be more circumspect of the use of such rights.  In such circumstances, the 
presence of matching rights may well be preclusive of a second bid, or may 
result in an inequitable distribution of the transaction surplus away from 
selling shareholders and therefore be unreasonable.  In any event, courts 
should refrain from treating matching rights as a standard contract term that 
requires little by way of substantive analysis. 
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APPENDIX:  MATCHING RIGHTS IN MERGER AGREEMENTS 
Transactions with some form of match right: 
Yes 328 (99.09%) 
No 3 (0.91%) 
Total 331 (100.00%) 
 
Transactions with simple information rights: 
Yes 326 (98.49%) 
No 5 (1.51%) 
Total 331 (100.00%) 
 
Transactions requiring advance notice prior to 
negotiating with third party (no-shop 
provision): 
Yes 71 (21.45%) 
No 260 (78.55%) 
Total 331 (100.00%) 
 
Average number of days of advance notice prior to engaging in 
negotiations with a third party regarding a potential superior offer:  2.16. 
 
Days Count 
Not Required 260 








Transactions requiring advance notice prior to 
change in board recommendation: 
Yes 251 (75.83%) 
No 80 (24.17%) 
Total 331 (100.00%) 
 
2011] RE-EVALUATING THE EMERGING STANDARD OF REVIEW 1051 
Average number of days of advance notice prior to change in board 
recommendation:  3.63. 
 
Days Count 
Not Required 80 












Transactions requiring advance notice prior to 
termination of agreement: 
Yes 93 (28.10%) 
No 238 (71.90%) 
Total 331 (100.00%) 
 


















1052 DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW [Vol. 36 
Transactions providing buyer with explicit 
right to match: 
Yes 135 (40.79%) 
No 196 (59.21%) 
Total 331 (100.00%) 
 
 
Transactions requiring seller to negotiate in 
good faith following third party offer: 
Yes 178 (53.78%) 
No 153 (46.22%) 
Total 331 (100.00%) 
 
Average number of days of delay built into merger agreement 
(implicit match period [sum of all advance notice provisions]): 4.5. 
 
Days Count 
0 22 
1 3 
2 20 
3 101 
4 37 
5 87 
6 24 
7 13 
8 12 
9 0 
10 9 
11 1 
12 2 
 
